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The Elasticity of Taxable Income:
Influences on Economic Efficiency
and Tax Revenues, and Implications
for Tax Policy
Seth H. Giertz

Taxes are frequently so much more burdensome to the people than
they are beneficial to the sovereign.
-Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations

While research into the elasticity of taxable income (ETr), which measures
the responsiveness of reported taxable income to changes in tax rates, dates
back to at least Lindsey (1987), recognition of its importance as a central
parameter for tax policy design did not begin to take hold until the second
half of the 1990s. 1 In fact, a 1998 survey to determine public and labor
economists' views on key policy parameters (Fuchs, Krueger, and Poterba
1998) included no questions on the ETI. 2 I suspect that a 2008 survey
would include such questions, just as I suspect that a 1998 conference
entitled "Tax Policy Lessons from the 1990s" would have no session on the
elasticity of taxable income. The two 1998 survey questions most likely
to provide some insight into the views public economists then held of
the ETI asked about the effect of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) and
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA93) on long-run
(steady-state) gross domestic product (GDP). For TRA86 , a fundamental
The author would like to thank David Weiner and Ed Harris for helpful comments.
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reform that broadened the tax base and substantially lowered marginal tax
rates, the median response was that steady-state GDP would rise by 1 percent. However, the interquartile range was large, from 0.20 to 3 percent of
GDP For OBRA93, which raised marginal tax rates for primarily upperincome groups, the median response was zero, with an interquartile range
from -0.5 to 1 percent of GDP It is noteworthy that half of public economists surveyed thought that raising marginal tax rates for the highestincome groups (in 1993) would not result in decreased steady-state GDP
Disagreement among public economists as to the effect of taxes on the
economy is embodied by the views of two former chairmen of the president's
Council of Economic Advisors (CEA). One former chairman, Martin Feldstein
(l995b, 1999), estimated that the 1993 tax increases substantially increased
deadweight loss (DWL) and that repealing the rate increases could actually
increase tax revenue because positive behavioral responses would more than
offset the mechanical revenue loss-that is, the loss in tax revenue absent any
behavioral responses. Another former CEA chairman, Joseph Stiglitz (2004),
viewed the 1993 tax increases in a quite different light: 'The Clinton experience showed that raising taxes on the rich does not have the adverse effects
that the critics claimed" (4). Additionally, Stiglitz is very critical of the Bush tax
cuts, while Feldstein supports the lower marginal tax rates. 3 One could argue
that the two former CEA chairmen take such different positions on recent tax
policy because of differing political ideologies or party allegiance. However, a
more plausible explanation is that they hold very different views of how
responsive individuals are to changes in tax rates. Feldstein's estimates for the
effects of repealing OBRA93 , for example, rest on an ETI estimate that is
toward the high end of the literature-although not implausible. 4 Stiglitz, on
the other hand, while not directly speaking to the ETI, believes that behavioral
responses to tax rates are small (at least for high-income individuals). If the ETI
is very small, then the revenue and efficiency implications from repealing
OBRA93 would be quite different from those estimated by Feldstein.

Developments in Assessing the Efficiency Implications of Taxation
Economists have long recognized that taxation creates economic inefficiency
by distorting the price of leisure relative to that of all other goods in the
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economy Even a broad-based income tax can have substantial efficiency
costs, so long as leisure remains untaxed. Harberger (1964) uses this as
motivation for comparing the efficiency implications of direct versus indirect taxation and in so doing shows how labor supply elasticities can be
used to measure the efficiency implications of income taxation. Harberger's
analysis won over the profession and led to increased research into labor
supply elasticities, which were seen as proxies for the efficiency costs from
taxation. 5 More than two decades later, Lindsey (1987) examined the ETI,
as opposed to the labor supply elasticity However, Lindsey emphasized the
revenue implications of the ETI and not its efficiency implications.
In addition to producing ETI estimates, Feldstein (1995b) described
the behaviors that could affect taxable income and argued that many of
these behaviors were not captured by labor supply elasticities. Thus, it is
more accurate to state that taxation creates economic inefficiency not only
by distorting the relative price of labor and leisure, but more broadly by distorting the relative price of goods or activities that are taxed and those that
are not taxed, since leisure is not the only untaxed activity For example, in
response to taxes, not only work hours but also work effort might change.
Compensation can shift from taxed forms to nontaxed forms. When tax
rates are higher, more compensation is paid in tax-exempt fringe benefits
instead of wages, and economic activity may shift from jurisdictions with
more burdensome taxes to others where taxes are more favorable. Evasion
is another response to taxation that confers DWL, but does not imply
increased leisure. In response to higher tax rates, people are more likely
to understate their incomes and to overstate their deductions. Over the long
run, taxes also influence investment decisions, including how much education to pursue and in what occupations to specialize.
Feldstein (1999)6 shows that one parameter, the ETI, can capture this
wide array of behavioral responses and can then be used to calculate both
the efficiency and revenue implications from a change in tax rates. In fact,
Feldstein shows that the ETI, along with information on marginal tax rates
and income, is all that is necessary to calculate changes in both tax revenue
and efficiency 7 In Harberger's (1964) model, labor is the only source of
income, all income is taxed when earned, taxable income thus equals labor
income, and the ETI with respect to the tax rate is the same as the labor
supply elasticity-or at least the elasticity of labor earnings, since labor
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hours and labor earnings may be imperfectly correlated due to factors such
as work effort. 8 Feldstein's model is more complex, recognizing that income
comes from many sources and that those sources are taxed differently (or
sometimes not taxed at all). Taxpayers can shift income, as well as alter their
tax deductions, exclusions, and credits; some of those behaviors result in
income escaping the tax base (gOing untaxed), while others allow taxpayers
to shift when and under what base (for example, individual versus corporate) income is reported and taxed. Taxpayers also have some discretion
over what share of their income is reported to the tax authorities. In this
more realistic setting, taxable income and labor income (and their corresponding tax elasticities) can differ substantially
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: In the next two
sections I focus on important developments in ETI research, both empirical
and theoretical, over the first decade of the twenty-first century and relate
them to important tax issues that the United States will face over the next
few years. Next, I examine the two most important Bush tax cuts, the
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA) and
the Jobs Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 OGTRRA), which
changed our tax system in many ways, including lowering individual marginal tax rates. The tax changes, however, are not permanent-that is, for the
most part, the federal tax system will, after 2010, revert to its 2001 state
unless additional legislation is enacted. Thus I go on to use a range of ETI
estimates from the literature to show how allOwing the individual income tax
rate cuts to expire might affect economic efficiency and tax revenues.
I find that, based on 2005 data, returning individual income tax rates
to their 2001 levels would raise revenues by $98.6 billion, assuming no
behavioral responses. 9 At an ETI of 0.2, $15.6 billion of this mechanical
increase ($12.2 billion from the federal income tax and $3.4 billion from
payroll and state taxes) would be lost due to reductions in taxable income.
At an ETI of 0.8, $62.4 billion of the mechanical revenue gain ($48.8 billion from the federal income tax and $13.6 billion from payroll and state
taxes) would be lost. The DWL per dollar of additional revenue from the
federal income tax is also highly sensitive to the ETI, ranging from $0.18 at
an ETI of 0.2 to $1.25 at an ETI of 0.8.10
I also calculate Laffer curves (which show the relationship between marginal tax rates and tax revenue) under a range of different ETI assumptions,
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with special attention focused on the top tax bracket. There is considerable
debate about the degree to which changes to tax rates affect revenues. My
analysis is not intended to settle this debate, but rather to show what ETI
assumptions are implicitly associated with the different points of view. Again,
estimates are quite sensitive to the ETI. At an ETI of 0.2, the estimated Laffer
tax rate for the top tax bracket is 78 percent; at an ETI of 1, the estimated
Laffer rate is just 41 percent---or slightly higher than the current effective
marginal tax rate for this group.

Developments in ETI Research since 2000
Slemrod (2002) presents a taxonomy of the ways in which people respond
to taxation and the costs associated with this behavior. These can be condensed to four broad areas:

1) Real behavior. This involves individuals changing their consumption or the amount they work, for example, by moving away
from taxed goods or activities toward those that are untaxed
or more lightly taxed. It also includes the shifting of income
across tax bases or to jurisdictions where tax rates are more favorable. The labor supply elasticity (which measures the trade-off
between time spent on labor and leisure) captures only a portion
of that response.
2) Timing of income receipt. Sammartino and Weiner (1997) show
overall patterns of adjusted gross income (AGI) that are consistent
with large transitory shifting at the top of the income distribution
surrounding OBRA93. The timing of executive compensation has
also been shown quite responsive to OBRA93 (Goolsbee 2000).11
Changes to the tax treatment of capital gains in 1987, 1997,
and 2003 all appear to have had a large short-term influence on
realization behavior. (Even the timing of marriages, births, and
deaths appears to be influenced by tax considerations.)
3) Circumvention. This includes both illegally (evasion) and legally
(avoidance) bypassing the tax system. In the case of evasion,
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income is concealed or at least not reported to the tax authorities. (See Slemrod and Yitzhaki 2002 and Slemrod 2007.) In the
case of avoidance, income is shifted (intertemporally or between
sources) so that a taxpayer receives more favorable tax treatment.
Diverting income into a tax-deferred retirement account is an
example of avoidance. Higher tax rates generally increase the
benefits from evasion and avoidance.12

4) Response to administration and compliance policy. Rigorous enforcement of tax laws and low compliance costs should limit evasion
and lead to smaller income responses of reportable taxable
income to tax changes. However, the benefits from such polices
must be weighed against the government's additional costs of
administering and enforcing the tax system, since these costs also
represent a loss to society In contrast, lax enforcement and high
compliance costs will tempt taxpayers to hide income, and thus
result in larger changes in taxable income when rates change. That
implies that, instead of structural parameters, taxable income
elasticities are endogenous and a function of institutions. The time
and money that taxpayers spend complying with tax laws and
regulations are also a substantial source of deadweight loss
(Guyton et al. 2003).

Behavioral changes have efficiency implications. To assess them accurately requires that we differentiate real behavioral changes that affect
resource allocation from mere accounting maneuvers that simply re-label
income. It requires that we distinguish between the shifting of activity from
inside to outside the tax base on the one hand, and the shifting of income
from one tax base to a different tax base on the other For example, following the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which set the tax rate on Subchapter S
income below that on Subchapter C income, Subchapter S income
increased nearly threefold as income was shifted from Subchapter C corporations to Subchapter S corporations. That shift of income was simply a
transfer from one tax base to another, but since individuals do not report
Subchapter C income, only half of the picture was in view: the increase in
Subchapter S income. Thus, without information on the drop in
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Subchapter C income, the relationship between the marginal income tax
rates and taxable personal income can have misleading implications for
both economic efficiency and tax revenues.
Issues That Complicate Estimation. The primary methodological objective in the empirical literature is to devise a method for separating the
response of taxable income to changes in tax rates from responses to the
many other factors that also affect taxable income. Tax changes take place
in a changing economic environment, and the changes to that environment
affect income growth. Adequately controlling for those non-tax-induced
trends in taxable income poses a major challenge to estimating elasticities.
In addition, a sound methodology must address several other important
issues, including mean reversion, tax rate endogeneity, institutional changes
(which often coincide with changes in the rate structure), and the distinction between transitory (or temporary) and permanent (or longer-term)
responses. Finally, some behavioral responses involve externalities or
transfers between economic agents which alter how the efficiency implications of the ETI should be interpreted. Some of the issues that complicate
estimation are discussed in more detail below.

Exogenous Shifts in the Income Distribution and Mean Reversion. The distribution of reported income has widened over the past thirty years. That trend
accelerated in the 1980s, especially at the very top of the distribution.
According to Piketty and Saez (2003), the share of income reported by the
top 10 percent of filers rose by more than 40 percent, from 33 percent in
1979 to 46.8 percent in 2006, with nearly two-thirds of that increase accruing to the top 1 percent of taxpayers. 13 The share of income reported by the
top one-half of 1 percent more than doubled, the share reported by the top
one-tenth of 1 percent nearly tripled, and the share reported by the top onehundredth of 1 percent more than quadrupled. Because people with the
highest income pay a disproportionate share of taxes-the top 1 percent
pays nearly 39 percent of all federal income taxes-their behavior is especially important. 14 Not fully accounting for the portion of income growth
unrelated to tax policy can result in large biases. For example, the cuts in
marginal tax rates in the 1980s were greatest at the top of the income distribution and were thus inversely correlated with the great income growth

108 TAX POLICY LESSONS FROM THE 2000s
at the very top of the distribution. The fact that the income growth at the
top of the income distribution is jagged (while following a decidedly
upward trend) makes controlling for it even more difficult. If the non-taxrelated portion of that income growth is not fully accounted for, that trend
will bias ETI estimates in a positive direction when tax rates fall (and in a
negative direction when tax rates rise).

Mean reversion is another issue that complicates estimation. Over a persons
lifetime, income often follows a general path with many fluctuations. After
a period when income is particularly high or low, it will often revert to a
more normal path. That phenomenon is especially pronounced at the tails
of the distribution. Those at the extreme right of the income distribution
are often not there for long, and will likely have a substantial drop in
income (that is unrelated to tax policy). At the other extreme, those in
school (or not employed) will often have large increases in income upon
entering the workforce. Not accounting for that mean reversion at the
tails of the distribution can substantially bias estimated elasticities. More
specifically, not fully controlling for mean reversion will erroneously count
both non-tax-related increases (by those below their lifetime path) and
non-tax-related decreases in taxable income (by those above their lifetime path) as responses to changes in tax rates. Those factors will bias
ETI estimates in opposite directions, depending on whether tax rates
are raised or lowered, but there is no reason to believe that the biases
will cancel each other out. Partly for that reason, many studies exclude
those with very low earnings. Those at the high end cannot be so easily discarded, since they are responsible for a large share of both taxable income
and tax revenues.
These issues are even further complicated by the fact that the size of taxable income elasticity appears to vary across the income distribution. That
is, estimated ETls are generally larger (sometimes much larger) for higherincome groups. In such cases, Navratil (1995) shows that some of the early
differences-in-differences approaches will produce biased estimates for each
group. Additionally, if the ETI does in fact vary with income, a single overall elasticity will not be applicable when considering the impact of rate
changes that target only part of the income distribution or that differ in
magnitude across the distribution.
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Endogeneity of the Tax Rate. Because of the federal tax system's progressivity,
it is almost axiomatic that a simple cross-section regression will show a
direct relationship between tax rates and taxable income. Even with longitudinal data, an individual's tax rate rises with taxable income. In order to
isolate the impact of taxes on taxable income, tax rates should be imputed
based on an instrumented (or exogenous) measure of taxable income. After
instrumenting, the correct relationship between taxable income and the tax
rate should be achieved for each individual, but that method does not
address the cross-sectional correlation between taxable income and tax
rates. Studies using cross-sectional variation for identification generally
must also include differencing methods (which transform the key dependent variable to the change in the tax rate).
Institutional Factors: Contemporaneous Tax Policy Changes. If institutional
changes to the tax system take effect contemporaneously with rate changes,
they could affect reported taxable income, biasing estimated elasticities, or
at least complicating the estimation. In fact, Slemrod (1996) shows that
changes to the underlying tax base may result in substantially different elasticities before and after a tax change. Most regression techniques yield a
weighted average of the two elasticities.
Most elasticity measures also assume policies toward tax evasion and
avoidance as given, when in fact those too are choices that policymakers
can change. Recent work emphasizes the role of institutional factors
(Slemrod and Kopczuk 2002, Kopczuk 2005) and shows that the elasticity
of taxable income is not a structural parameter, but rather a function of the
tax system. Taxpayers are more responsive when opportunities to avoid
taxes are more prevalent (or less costly). Possible influences on responses to
taxes include the availability of substitutable forms of compensation (such
as the ability of firms to use nontaxable fringe benefits as opposed to taxable compensation) and the expected penalties for evasion.
The definition of taxable income itself may influence results. Changes
to the tax system may alter that definition. Using the concurrent definition
for taxable income (that is, the definition that was in effect when the income
was received) will confound responses to tax rates with statutory changes
to the tax base. But even if a consistent measure is chosen, Slemrod (1998)
shows that estimates may depend on the definition used and that even a
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constant-law definition can yield biased results. And Heim (2007) shows
that taxable income elasticities will be biased if the definition of taxable
income changes, unless there are cross-price elasticities of zero between
goods whose tax status changes and those that are always taxable.

Transitory versus Permanent Responses and Income Shifting. Permanent, or
longer-term, behavioral responses to tax changes are of primary importance; transitory responses are a lesser concern. For illustration, suppose
that in 1986 taxpayers knew that the tax rates were set to fall in 1987. In
the short term, some may have delayed the receipt of income from
December 1986 to January 1987. That response would not have affected
real economic behavior and would not have influenced long-term taxable
income. By contrast, a longer-term response like a persistent change in
investment or labor market behavior would have affected the allocation
of resources and taxable income for years to come. That is not to say that
transitory behavior is always small or trivial. For example, capital gains realizations rose by over 96 percent from 1985 to 1986 in anticipation of lessfavorable treatment of capital gains set to begin in 1987.
Separating transitory from permanent responses is often difficult.
Measuring changes in taxable income in the year prior to and the years
succeeding a tax change will likely yield a combination of permanent and
transitory responses. Phase-in periods and taxpayer expectations about
future tax legislation also matter. For example, if rate cuts phase in, people
not only divert income (on paper) to the future, but also may substitute
leisure in the short term for work in the future when the rates are fully lowered. In that instance, intertemporal substitution could result in a near-term
understatement and a longer-term overstatement of the ETI.
A related issue is the relationship between tax policy and long-term
career and investment decisions. Tax policy can affect investment in both
human and physical capital, which over time can influence taxable income.
That long-run response is important in measuring the true response to tax
changes, but may not be fully observed for many years follOwing a tax
change, leading to an understatement of the ETI.
Transfers between Economic Agents. Chetty (forthcoming) warns that the large
elasticities found for high-income groups may overstate the efficiency implica-
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tions of this groups behavior. Chetty suggests that behavioral responses by
upper-income filers are more likely to involve "fiscal externalities"- i.e., behavioral responses may reflect the shifting of economic activity to other agents in
the economy, or in some cases sheltering income has external transfer costsand thus implying a difference between the private and social costs of avoiding
taxes. Carroll (1998) notes the possibility of income shifting between economic
agents. For example, a highly paid lawyer may reduce his workload in response
to a tax increase targeted at high earners, but his reduction may shift business
to lawyers in lower tax brackets. As an example of transfer costs, Chetty suggests that an executive may be deterred from taking a larger share of compensation in the form of fringe benefits because doing so would require offering
more fringe benefits to other employees in the firm. Another case of transfer
costs involves the potential for fines imposed by the IRS. The expected value of
these fines represents a cost to a subset of taxpayers. However, this is not a
deadweight loss to society as a whole because the cost to those evading taxes is
exactly offset by additional revenues "transferred" to the government.
Recent ETI Estimates. As the obstacles to identification have become better
recognized, more sophisticated methods and richer datasets have been used
to estimate the ETI. A striking result is that ETI estimates, while remaining
quite sensitive to a wide array of factors, have tended downward from the earliest estimates by Feldstein (199Sa) and Lindsey (1987). These first studies
reported estimated ETIs of between 1 and 3. More recent studies report estimates closer to 0.4, but estimates still range from close to 0 to greater than 1.
In addition to displaying this sensitivity to specification decisions, estimates
have been found to vary across time and across the income distribution. IS
An influential study by Gruber and Saez (2002) examines taxable income
responses to the tax cuts of 1981 and 1986 using a panel of tax returns
for years 1979 through 1990. This approach lays the groundwork for papers
by Kopczuk (2005), Giertz (2006, 2007), and Heim (2007, forthcoming).
Gruber and Saez calculate constant-law income using 1990 law excluding
capital gains and using the National Bureau of Economic Researchs TAXSIM
model to estimate federal and state tax rates. They then apply two-stage least
squares, regressing the log of the income growth (over three-year intervals)
against the log change in the net-of-tax rate plus year fixed effects and dummies for marital status. 16 Recognizing the possibility of mean reversion and
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secular trends in income, they explore two additional specifications, 1) the log
of initial period income as an independent variable; and 2) a ten-piece spline
of the log of initial period income.
They are most confident in an income-weighted estimated ETI of 0.40
from the model that includes a ten-piece spline based on the natural log of
initial period income. The spline allows the functional relationship between
the dependent variable and the independent variables to vary by decile.
Gruber and Saez:S (2002) corresponding elasticity for a broader measure of
income is much smaller, 0.12, suggesting that much of the taxable income
response comes through deductions, exemptions, and exclusions, rather than
changes in labor supply
Kopczuk (2005) uses the same panel as Gruber and Saez to estimate the
ETI and to test the hypothesis that the ETI is not a structural parameter, but
rather a function of the tax system's structure. Kopczuk models taxable
income as a function not just of tax rates, but also of the interaction between
tax rates and the size of the tax base, which is used as a proxy for the cost of
shifting funds outside the tax base. Additionally, Kopczuk treats mean reversion and divergence within the income distribution as separate phenomena
by including separate variables to control for them. Kopczuk:S estimates are
extremely sensitive to both sample selection and model specification.
However, he does find evidence of a relationship between the size of the tax
base and the ETI-favoring a specification which finds that a one percentage
point increase in the tax base lowers the ETI by 0.79 percent.
Giertz (2007) uses a panel of tax returns from 1979 to 2001 (that heavily
oversamples high-income filers) in order to estimate taxable income and broad
income elasticities. Applying the methods of Gruber and Saez (2002), he
reports an estimated ETI for the 1980s that is slightly larger than that in Gruber
and Saez, but the analogous estimate for the 1990s is less than half as large
(0.20). FollOwing Kopczuk (2005), Giertz includes separate and nonlinear controls for mean reversion and divergence within the income distribution. This
explains about one-third of the difference between the estimates for the 1980s
and the 1990s, lowering the 1980s estimate to 0.40 and raising the 1990s estimate to 0.26. Additionally, Kopczuk:S work implies that changes to the tax base
since 1986 could account for a portion of the remaining difference.
Heim (2007) and Giertz (2006) use a variety of approaches to estimate
taxable income elasticities for years covering the OBRA90 and OBRA93 tax
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increases. Heim's preferred specification yields estimated ETIs ranging from
0.46 to 0.58 depending on the length of the interval over which income
changes are measured. Both papers attempt to control for adjacent-year
income shifting when measuring behavioral changes over intervals of several years. When measuring behavioral responses from 1991 to 1994, for
example, controlling for adjacent-year shifting recognizes that 1991 income
may have been influenced by income shifting between 1990 and 1991
(since tax rates rose in 1990), and that 1994 income may have been influenced by shifting between 1993 and 1994 (since tax rates rose in 1993).
Both papers report estimates that are quite sensitive to an array of factors.
Heim concludes that the range of estimates reported in the paper often
"resulted from small changes in the specification, [and] includes most a priori educated guesses as to what the taxable income elasticity would be ...
suggest [ing] that it may never be possible to pin down the taxable income
elasticity with any reasonable degree of accuracy" (33).
Heim (forthcoming) is one of the first to look at responses to the 2001
and 2003 tax cuts. The paper uses a panel of individual tax returns spanning
years 1999 to 2005. Heim measures responses over three-year intervals,
employing controls common to the literature since Gruber and Saez (2002),
and reports a "best estimate" of around 0.25 when not accounting for
adjacent-year income shifting. However, much smaller and statistically
insignificant estimates are reported when accounting for adjacent-year shifting' causing him to conclude that most of the response to the tax changes was
intertemporal (or transitory) income shifting. The large estimated coefficients
on the adjacent-year tax rates are somewhat puzzling in this instance. With
tax rates rising, there is an incentive to shift income to an earlier period. This
would likely involve shifting of income from 2003 to 2002. Marginal tax rates
for moderate- and upper-income groups fell only slightly prior to 2003, but
fell substantially in 2003 whenJGTRRA passed, expediting the rate cuts that
had been scheduled to phase in over the next few years. However, the 2003
rate cuts were a surprise. For such an unanticipated drop in rates, there would
be no (or very little) opportunity to shift income backward.
Auten, Carroll, and Gee (2008) also use tax return data from 1999 to
2005 to measure behavioral responses to the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts. They
compare behavior over two-year intervals and restrict their sample to filers
ages twenty-five to sixty-one with more than $50,000 in taxable income.
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Instead of controlling for mean reversion and divergence in the income distribution by using a function of base-year (or lagged) taxable income, they include
variables on financial income, proxies for entrepreneurship, and regional and
occupational dummies. In addition, they include functions of age and number
of children in the family They report a population-weighted estimated ETI of
0.35 (almost identical to their income-weighted estimate). Including taxpayers
over age sixty-one lowers their estimate to 0.28. Restricting the sample to those
with incomes over $200,000 raises their ETI estimate to 1.09.
In another paper looking at recent tax changes, Singleton (2007) focuses on EGTRRAs provision designed to reduce the marriage penalty He uses
Current Population Survey data linked to Social Security earnings records
to examine behavioral responses to this provision, which substantially lowered marginal tax rates (MTRs) for married couples with taxable income
ranging from $46,700 to $54,193 (in 2002 dollars). This provision did not
alter MTRs for single filers or filers with incomes above or below this range.
Singleton reports overall estimated elasticities that range from 0.16 to 0.66,
with estimates varying by education and other demographics. These estimates are for earned income and not fully taxable income.
Most of the recent empirical ETI research has relied on panel data. An
exception is Saez (2004), who builds on work by Slemrod (1996) and
Feenberg and Poterba (1993) by using aggregated time-series data spanning
1960 to 2000. Saez uses a consistent definition of income (that more
closely approximates AGI less capital gains, as opposed to taxable income)
and average marginal tax rates for different income groups. Saez's study
does not focus primarily on a single tax change, but examines the responses to all tax changes over the past four decades.
Regressing the log of taxable income against the log of the net -of-tax
rate plus a time-trend polynomial results in a statistically insignificant estimated ETI of 0.20. For the top 1 percent of the taxable income distribution,
Saez reports a much larger and statistically significant ETI estimate of 0.50.
Corresponding ETI estimates for the bottom 99 percent of the distribution
are negative (but not statistically different from 0).
Saez reports estimated ETIs that vary greatly over some subsets of the forty
years examined. For example, dividing the change in log income between
1981 and 1984 by the change in logged net-of-tax rates between the same two
years yields an estimated ETI of 0.77. The same analysis comparing 1985 to
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1988 yields a much larger estimated ETI, 1.7. Comparing 1991 with 1994
yields an estimated ETI of about o. The variation in ETIs over time is consistent with Goolsbee (1999) and Giertz (2007), who both find very different
elasticities when employing identical techniques to different time periods.
Saez (2004) also employs a regression framework that uses taxable
income shares to estimate ETIs for different segments of the taxable income
distribution. Special attention is paid to the top 1 percent of filers. For the
various taxable income groups, Saez regresses the log of the group's share
of taxable income against the log of the net-of-tax rate. Without any time
trends, that regression yields an estimated ETI of 1.58 for the top 1 percent.
Including both the time trend and square of the time trend yields an estimated ETI of 0.62. Saez expresses confidence in the 0.62 estimate because
that regression has an adjusted coefficient of determination of 0.98, and the
fitted values do an excellent job of tracking the trend in the share of income
reported by the top 1 percent.
Further segmentation of the income distribution shows that, even
among the top 1 percent of the distribution, estimated ETIs vary greatly by
income. In fact, the same approach that yields 0.62 for the top 1 percent
yields an estimated ETI of 1.09 for the top 0.01 of 1 percent. For those in
the ninetieth to ninety-fifth percentiles, the same approach yields a negative
(although statistically insignificant) estimated ETI.

Applying the ETI for Tax Policy

Saez (2004) presents a method for assessing the revenue and efficiency
implications resulting from changes in marginal tax rates. That method is
described in this section and applied in the following section. 17 Saez, building on the work of Feldstein (1999), breaks the change in revenues resulting from an increase in tax rates on the top tax bracket into a mechanical
and behavioral response, such that

z ) ( EMTR )]18
L1revenue = N • MMTR • (z - z)· [1 - ETI· ( (z _ z) • 1 _ EMTR

(1)

Here, z is average taxable income for those in the top rate bracket, Z is
the level of taxable income where the top tax rate kicks in, and N is the
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number of taxpayers in the top bracket. EMIR is the effective marginal tax
rate-the share of an additional dollar of income that is paid to the government- and EII is the elasticity of taxable income. The first part of equation (1), N • i1EMIR • (z - z), equals the mechanical response, or the change
in tax revenue assuming no behavioral responses. Thus, if EII equals 0,
there is no behavioral response, and tax revenue increases linearly with the
tax rate. The second piece inside the brackets,
ETI.

(_z_).(
(z - z)

EMTR )
1 - EMTR '

is the share of the mechanical response that is offset by changes in behavior.
If this share is greater than 1, it implies a Laffer response-that is, an increase
in the MTR results in a decrease in tax revenue. Note that the Laffer (or revenue-maximizing) rate equals

Note also that rearranging equation (1) to highlight revenue changes from
the mechanical and behavioral responses yields
I
~Revenue

=

Mechanical Response

I

Behavioral Response or Marginal Deadweight Loss

)
N. MMTR • (z - z) - ETI . MMTR • N. z ( 1_EMTR
EMTR'

(2)

Finally; the behavioral response is also exactly equal to the change in
DWL resulting from the tax rate change. 19 The behavioral response from
equation (2) encompasses revenue changes from the federal, payroll, and
state tax bases combined--even for a tax increase in just the federal ratebecause the bases overlap. By imputing income at the new tax rates, z', where

z'=z· (l-ETI·(l_~TR))'

(3)

one can calculate the overall revenue offset to the individual income tax
separately from the overall change in revenues. Thus, when behavioral
responses are accounted for, the change in federal income tax revenue from
raising the rate on the top income tax bracket can be expressed such that
Mederal Revenue

=

N· (MMTR. (z'- z) - federaLEMTR • (z - z') )

(4)

Note that total efficiency costs from the tax system, as opposed to the incremental costs of a change in rates, can be expressed such that
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Deadweight Loss

=

EMTR2)

0.5 • (
l-EMTR

• ETI •

L
N

(z - z),

(5)

i=l

which is analogous to the usual Harberger DWL formula. Other things
being equal, tax increases for upper-income groups will result in greater
DWL because these groups face higher EMTRs and because the DWL
increases by the square of the tax rate.

Data and Institutional Background
One of the most significant economic policy initiatives of the Bush administration has been lowering marginal tax rates on ordinary individual
income, as well as rates on capital gains and dividends. In order to garner
enough political support for the tax cuts, the administration agreed to
labyrinthine legislation, in which most of the provisions phase in and
phase out (or end abruptly) between 2001 and 2011. These tax changes
remain a hotly contested issue, in part because they are set to expire after
2010, at which time tax rates will revert to their 2001 levels, but also
because of America's long-term fiscal outlook: absent substantial changes,
government expenditures are projected to exceed revenues at an unprecedented rate.
The centerpiece of the Bush tax cuts was the Economic Growth Tax
Relief and Reconciliation Act of 2001, which lowered marginal tax rates and
expanded allowable credits and deductions. This was followed by the 2003
Jobs Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act, which accelerated the marginal rate cuts from EGTRRA that were not set to fully phase in until 2006.
Additionally, JGTRRA substantially lowered tax rates on capital gains and
dividends. Another provision of EGTRRA reduced the marriage penalty
by expanding the size of the 15 percent tax bracket for married filers
only20 Table 5-1 shows the marginal tax rate schedules (for the individual
income tax) before EGTRRA and after JGTRRA. For those at the 28 percent
statutory rate and above, marginal income tax rates are scheduled to rise
by roughly 10 percent after 2010. The consequences of letting these tax
cuts expire (as measured both in terms of tax revenue and in terms of
economic efficiency) is the focus of the next section.
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TABLE 5-1
FEDERAL INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX SCHEDULE (IN

2000 &: 2011

2003-2010

2005

DOLLARS)

Married Filing Head of
Separately Household

Tax Rates

Single
Filers

Married Filing
Jointlya

15%

10%

0-$7,300

0-$14,600

0-$7,300

0-$10,450

15%b

15%

$7,301$29,700

$14,601$59,400

$7,301$29,700

$10,451$39,800

28%

25%

$29,701$71,950

$59,401$119,950

$29,701$59,975

$39,801$102,800

31%

28%

$71,951$150,150

$119,951$182,800

$59,976$91,400

$102,801166,450

36%

33%

$150,151- $182,801$326,450 $326,450

$91,401$163,225

$166,451$326,450

39.6%

35%

$326,451
or more

$163,226
or more

$326,451
or more

Tax Rates

$326,451
or more

SOL"RCE: IRS tax schedules.
NOTES: a. The same schedule applies to qualifying widows/widowers; b. This assumes that the
marriage penalty relief will be extended.

The difference between the projected 2011 rate schedule and the schedule for 2003-2010 is the percentage point change in the tax rate for each
group of taxpayers. More specifically, this is the change in statutory MTRs.
Because I am looking at the effect of allowing the individual rates to rise
while maintaining other features of the tax system, I assume that this also
represents the projected change in the effective marginal tax rate. However,
the EMTR-as noted earlier, the share of an additional dollar of income that
is paid to the government-is often somewhat different from the statutory
MTR because the EMTR takes into account phase-ins, phaseouts, and other
interactions with the IRS code. These other factors affect the actual share of
income that the government receives.
Consider the personal exemption phaseout (PEP), which requires taxpayers to reduce their personal exemption by 3 percent for each dollar that
their income exceeds the phaseout floor (until the personal exemption is
reduced to zero). Thus, taxable income increases by $103 for every additional
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TABLE

5-2

EFFECTIVE MARGINAL TAX RATES FOR

Statutory Bracket

2005

(PERCENTAGES)

Federal EMTR

Payroll EMTR

State EMTR

Total EMTR

0

-1.6

13.5

0.9

12.7

10

14.8

12.8

2.6

30.2

15

16.3

12.5

6.1

34.9

25

26.3

10.0

3.7

40.0

28

30.1

5.3

3.7

39.0

33

34.7

3.2

3.5

41.3

35

34.7

2.5

3.4

40.7

SOURCE:

CBO 2005.

$100 of income within the phaseout range. The EMTR is then equal to the
MTR plus 0.03 times the MTR, or for someone in the 35 percent tax bracket,
36.05 percent (that is, 1.03 times 35). According to CBO (2005), when all
the intricacies of the tax code are taken into account, the range of EMTRs for
the individual income tax is from -1.6 percent (for those often not paying
income tax, but sometimes receiving refundable tax credits such as the Earned
Income Tax Credit) to almost 35 percent (for the top two statutory tax brackets). These findings are presented in table 5-2. Table 5-2 also shows what happens when payroll and state taxes are included. While the individual income
tax hits upper-income groups the hardest (at the margin), federal payroll taxes
(used to finance Social Security and Medicare) hit lower-income groups the
hardest. EMTRs for state taxes are greatest for middle-income groups. When
these three taxes are combined, EMTRs range from just over 30 per-cent for the
10 percent bracket to over 41 percent for the 33 percent bracket. 21
While these EMTRs account for the intricacies of the tax system, they
are based on standard convention, which assumes that marginal income is
earned income. (I exclude filers whose top MTR is from capital gains.)
However, marginal rates could differ from imputed EMTRs, if behavior at
the margin includes changes to fringe benefits, perquisites, itemized deductions or business income. For example, with respect to earned income,
payroll taxes are likely relevant at the margin, but payroll taxes would not
be relevant for responses to itemized deductions or many (but not all)
fringe benefits. If a portion of behavioral responses includes some of
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TABLE

2005

5-3

INDIVIDUAL INCOME AND TAX REVENUES BY TAX BRACKET

Income Total

Income
at MTR

Tax Revenue
Total

Tax Revenue
atMTR

10

130,864

107,061

12,612

10,706

15

1,028,305

589,969

132,330

88,495

25

1,411,064

241,641

237,515

60,410

28

503,828

36,360

104,491

10,181

33

387,519

79,067

92,352

26,092

35

1,094,230

565,392

315,443

197,887

Total

4,555,810

1,619,489

894,743

393,772

Statutory
MTR (%)

Source: IRS 2007.
NOTE: Dollar values are in millions.

these changes, then true EMTRs would be lower than those reported in
table 5-2. However, it is unlikely that this would have much effect on
prospective change in MTRs resulting from the expiration of EGTRRA and
JGTRRA after 2010.
In addition to the information on EMTRs by tax bracket, two other
pieces of information are crucial for employing the formulae (laid out earlier) that estimate the revenue and efficiency implications of allOwing the
individual tax rates to expire. We need to know both the ETI and the corresponding information on the amount of taxable income that is reported
in each of the individual income tax brackets. The income information is
published by the IRS and is summarized in table 5-3. 22
Table 5-3 shows nearly $4.6 trillion in (modified) taxable income and
nearly $900 billion in total tax revenue for 2005. These numbers are somewhat smaller than the actual totals for 2005 because they exclude filers
whose top MTR is for income from capital gains. 23
The final piece of information, the ETI, is the trickiest. As discussed
above, the empirical literature on the ETI suggests a wide range of plausible estimates, and considerable disagreement surrounds the size of this
parameter. Thus the next section shows how the expiring cuts in individual MTRs might affect revenue and efficiency under a range of different
ETIs. This approach aims to show what implicit views of the ETI may
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underlie different views on tax policy-especially views on the relationship
between rate changes and revenues. Additionally; it highlights the sensitivity of revenue estimates to a range of ETI assumptions.
Before proceeding, some caveats are in order. The results that follow are
not from a full micro simulation model with behavioral responses made at the
individual level. There are a number of reasons why results from such an exercise might differ from those presented in the next section. First, EMTRs differ
within a statutory tax bracket, while here the average EMTR is applied to
aggregated taxable income for each of the respective tax brackets. Second,
some individuals are close to the bottom of their tax bracket, which would
likely censor behavioral responses to a rise in the brackets tax rate. Saez (2002)
finds that while taxpayers by and large do not bunch at the kinks, there are
still some who are near kink points. Because I am not using individual-level
data, I do not censor responses. Third, income measures are taken from table
3.4 of IRS (2007), which groups filers by their top MTR. I exclude taxpayers
whose top tax rate is for capital gains inconle. Some taxpayers, however, have
capital gains income that is taxed at a rate lower than their top rate. This
income may be included in my measure. Finally; I apply EMTRs for labor (that
is, earned) income when estimating behavioral responses. The EMTR may be
the best choice here, but it is imprecise. Some income, at the margin, may
result from realizing capital gains; other income, at the margin, may be business income that is exempt from payroll taxes. Even if responses represent
changes to earned income, EMTRs can vary depending on which member of
the tax unit is reporting the additional income. Moreover, responses may
reflect changes to itemized deductions, in which case the EMTR should
exclude payroll taxes. The decision to use EMTRs for earned income may
disproportionately bias responses for top tax brackets, since a larger share of
this groups income comes from sources other than labor. However, the
EMTR from the payroll tax is just 2.5 percent for high-income groups, whereas it exceeds 12.5 percent for the bottom two brackets. The choice of which
EMTR to use is problematic even when using individual-level panel data.
Despite these caveats, this is a useful exercise that illustrates the range
of revenue responses and efficiency consequences resulting from the expiration of the Bush tax cuts. It also shows that these questions can be
broached even by those who do not have access to confidential tax
returns-in other words, the vast majority of scholars.
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Revenue and Efficiency Implications of Expiring Tax Legislation

The mechanical change in revenues from allowing the individual rates to
expire-that is, the change in individual income tax revenues assuming no
behavioral responses-is estimated here at $98.6 billion. 24 (See table 5-4.)
That is 13 percent greater than actual 2005 revenues. 25 For the mechanical
calculation, only revenues from the individual income tax change, since the
mechanical calculation ignores taxable income responses to the change in
rates. Behavioral responses, though, lower revenues from the individual
income tax and from payroll and state taxes (which further offsets revenue
increases from the individual income tax), since these bases overlap. About
38 percent of the mechanical revenue increase results from changing the 10
percent tax bracket back to IS percent. This has the biggest effect both
because the rate on this bracket is scheduled to undergo the largest percentage point increase, and because the increase in rates increases revenues not
just from those facing this marginal rate, but also from filers in all the higher
brackets (who pay this rate on some of their income). The 35 percent rate
bracket, which is slated to rise to 39.6, is the second most important in terms
of the expected mechanical increase in revenues. This bracket accounts for
nearly 23 percent (or $26 billion) of the expected increase in revenues. In
contrast to what occurs when the 10 percent bracket is raised, here, all the
additional revenue is from filers in this marginal rate bracket. Although less
than 1 percent of filers face this top bracket, this group reported over half of
one trillion dollars in 2005 taxable income (IRS 2007).
Projecting tax revenues under a range of ETI estimates shows the extent
to which behavioral responses might reduce the mechanical gain in tax revenues. Recall that this difference between the mechanical and actual change
in revenues is also equal to the efficiency cost (or deadweight loss) resulting from the tax increase. As figure 5-1, figure 5-2, and table 5-5 show, a
modest ETI of 0.2 would lower the gain in federal income tax revenues by
more than 12 percent (or $12.2 billion, from $98.6 billion to $86.5 billion)
compared to the mechanical gain. (When payroll and state taxes are
accounted for, the revenue offset and total DWL rise nearly 28 percent, to
$15.6 billion.) A large ETI of 1.0 would wipe away 62 percent (or $60.9
billion) of the revenue gain, and an additional 17 percent (or $17 billion)
would be lost from payroll and state revenues. Revenues from filers in the
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TABLE

5-4

EFFICIENCY CONSEQUENCES OF LETTING THE BUSH
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX CUTS EXPIRE

2005

Mechanical
Revenue

MTR

Behavioral Response = Change in DWL
ETI=

~

0.2

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.8

1.0

10%

43,015

555

1,100

1,473

1,745

2,290

2,835

15%

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

25%

17,293

5,364

10,708

13,376

16,053

21,398

26,742

28%

5,772

1,719

3,440

4,307

5,167

6,888

8,602

33%

6,522

1,567

3,123

3,901

4,689

6,246

7,808

35%

26,041

6,392

12,795

15,972

19,157

25,535

31,907

98,643

15,596

31,167

39,029

46,811

62,357

77,894

Total

Author's calculations.
Dollar values are in millions of 2005 dollars; N/A

SOCRCE:
NOTES:

FIGURE

=

not applicable.

5-1

CHANGE IN TAX REVENUES RESULTING FROM THE EXPIRATION
OF CUTS IN INDIVIDUAL MARGINAL TAX RATES
$95
Total Mechanical Change in Tax Revenues = $98, 643

$85
$75
$65
$55
I/)

I:

~

iii

$45
$35
$25
$15
$5
-$5
-$15
-$25
ETI =

0.2

0.4

D

SOURCE:

0.5

0.6

0.8

Federal Income Tax Revenue • Payroll and State Tax Revenue

Author's calculations.

1.0
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FIGURE

CHANGE IN DEADWEIGHT

Loss

5-2

RESULTING FROM THE EXPIRATION OF

CUTS IN INDIVIDUAL MARGINAL TAX RATES
$100
.......... Total Mechanical Change in Tax Revenues

$90
$80
$70
$60
$50
<II

c

~

$40

iii
$30
$20
$10
$0
- $10
ETI =

0.2

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.8

1.0

1_ 10"10 0 25"10 .28"10 . 33"10 . 35"10 1

SOURCE :

Author's calculations.

15 percent bracket rise by $21.9 billion under each scenario, even though
their MTR is not scheduled to change when the cuts expire.26 Members of
this group pay more in taxes because their taxable income that was below
the 15 percent rate was taxed at 10 percent, but would be taxed at 15 percent. It is assumed that there are no income effects and thus that this group
does not change its behavior. At an ETI of o.5-halfway between the
extremes already discussed-the increase in federal revenues from the tax
increase is 45 percent (or $30.5 billion) smaller than under the mechanical
case, and an additional 28 percent (or $8.5 billion) would be lost from payroll and state revenues. As shown in table 5-5 , the one-year revenue gain in
federal income taxes from the expiration of the cuts in individual tax rates
would equal $98.6 billion with no behavioral response; $86.5 billion when
assuming an ETI of 0.2; and $37 .8 billion when assuming an ETI of l.
In each case, 36 percent of the reduction in federal income tax revenues
(compared to the mechanical case) results from behavioral responses by
those 0.7 percent of filers in the top income tax bracket. Forty-four percent
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TABLE 5-5
REVENUE CONSEQUENCES OF LETTING THE BUSH
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX CUTS EXPIRE
Total Revenue Change = Mechanical Change - DWL
ETI=

Mechanical ~
0.2
Revenue

2005
MTR
10%

15%

25%

28%

33%

35%

Total

Income tax

43,015

Other bases

N/A

42,732
-272

Income tax
Other bases

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

Income tax

17,293

Other bases

N/A

Income tax

5,772

Other bases

N/A

Income tax

6,522

Other bases

N/A

Income tax

26,041

Other bases

N/A

Income tax

98,643

Other bases

N/A

0.4

0.5

0.6

42,449 42,208 42,066
-534
-796
-666

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

13,641 10,000 8,178 6,348
-1,712 -3,415 -4,261 -5,108

0.8

1.0

41,783 41,501
-1,058 -1,321

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

2,708
-6,812

-937
-8,512

4,411
-358

3,055
-724

2,378
-912

1,700
-1,095

-1,013
343
-1,458 -1,817

5,192
-237

3,863
-465

3,198
-578

2,534
-701

1,205
-929

-123
-1,163

20,480 14,909 12,183 9,417
-831 -1,663 -2,114 -2,533

3,887
-3,381

-1,647
-4,219

86,456 74,277 68,145 62,065 49,925 37,780
-3,409 -6,801 -8,531 -10,234 -13,639 -17,032

Source: Author's calculations.
NOTES: Dollar values are in millions of 2005 dollars;

NI A=

not applicable.

of the reduction in federal income tax revenues is attributable to the 1.8
percent of filers in the top two tax brackets. If the ETI increases with
income, as the empirical literature suggests, these shares would be even
larger. Some have suggested returning rates to their 2001 levels for just the
top two tax brackets. At an ETI of 0.5, this would imply just $15.4 billion
more in annual revenues (from the federal income tax) and $19.9 billion in
increased DWL. At an ETI of 0.2, federal income tax revenues would be
expected to increase by $25.7 billion, with $8 billion in additional DWL.
At an ETI of 1, the tax increase would move the top two tax brackets past
their Laffer (or revenue-maximizing) rate. Thus this would actually lead to
a reduction in overall revenues and an increase in DWL.
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Marginal Deadweight Loss. The changes in revenues and in DWL from
changes in tax policy can be combined into a measure that captures the
increase in DWL associated with a one-dollar increase in revenues (or, for
a tax cut, the reduction in DWL associated with a one-dollar reduction in
revenues). This measure of marginal DWL simply equals the change in revenues divided by the change in DWL. As tables 5-6a and 5-6b show, ranges
in ETI of 0.2 to 1 imply a tremendous range in the efficiency costs associated with raising additional revenue (by allowing MTRs to return to their
2001 levels). At an ETI of 0.2, for example, allowing the tax cuts to expire
would result in a marginal DWL (per dollar of federal income tax revenue)
of $0 . IS-that is, for each additional dollar the federal government receives
in revenue, society would be worse off by $O.IS. At an ETI of 1, the marginal DWL rises to $2.06 per additional dollar of income tax revenue raised.
At an ETI of 0.5, this number is $0.57. When revenue offsets to the other
tax bases are accounted for, the marginal DWL rises by just 4 percent at an
ETI of 0.2, but by S2 percent at an ETI of 1.0.
For comparison, consider the use in Feldstein (999) of an individuallevel microsimulation model to assess the possible implications of a 10 percent increase in marginal tax rates. Feldstein concludes that, assuming an
ETI of 1.04, behavioral responses would erase over two-thirds of the
mechanical gain in tax revenues and that the marginal DWL would be over
$2 per every additional dollar of revenue. Using more recent data and
assuming an ETI of 0.4, Feldstein (200S) reports a marginal DWL of $0.76
per additional dollar of revenue raised. At an ETI of 0.4, my estimated DWL
is smaller, at $0.42 per dollar of federal income tax revenue, but it rises to
$0.62 when I account for revenue offsets to the payroll tax and to the states.
Note that Feldstein is considering a case where rates for each bracket
increase by the same percentage. The case examined here is different, since
brackets change by different percentages and one group (those currently in
the 15 percent bracket) experiences no change in its MTR.
For a given ETI, the efficiency implications of raising tax rates vary
greatly across the brackets. Those in the 15 percent tax bracket drive down
the overall DWL per dollar measure because this group is assumed to have
no behavioral response (since its MTR does not change); but it does pay
more in taxes because the 10 percent bracket rises to 15 percent. Raising the
bottom 00 percent) tax bracket has only minor efficiency implications. The
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TABLE 5-6a
MARGINAL DEADWEIGHT Loss
(PER ADDITIONAL DOLLAR OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX REVENUE)
2005

ETI

=

MTR

0.2

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.8

1.0

10%

0.01

0.03

0.03

0.04

0.05

0.07

15%

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

25%

0.39

1.07

1.64

2.53

7.90

28%

0.39

1.13

1.81

3.04

20.09

33%

0.30

0.81

1.22

1.85

5.19

35%

0.31

0.86

1.31

2.03

6.57

N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

0.18

0.42

0.57

0.75

1.25

2.06

Total
SOURCE:

Author's calculations.
TABLE 5-6b
MARGINAL DEADWEIGHT Loss
(PER ADDITIONAL DOLLAR OF REVENUE INCLUDING
REVENUE OFFSETS FROM PAYROLL AND STATE TAXES)

2005

ETI

=

MTR

0.2

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.8

1.0

lO%

0.01

0.03

0.04

0.04

0.06

0.07

15%

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

25%

0.45

1.63

3.41

12.95

28%

0.42

1.48

2.94

8.54

N/A
N/A
N/A

33%

0.32

0.92

1.49

2.56

22.65

35%

0.33

0.97

1.59

2.78

50.49

N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

Total

0.19

0.46

0.65

0.90

1.72

3.75

SOCRCE:

Author's calculations.

marginal DWL per dollar of revenue ranges from $0.01 at an ETI of 0.2 to
$0.07 at an ETI of 1. This is partly because those in the lower tax brackets
face a lower EMTR than those in the higher brackets and because the DWL
increases by the square of the EMTR. Another reason for the low efficiency
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costs is that much of the additional revenue comes from those in higher tax
brackets, who have income taxed in this bracket as well. Since the marginal
income for these higher-income groups is in another tax bracket, their
behavior is not affected by the rate changes (in lower brackets).27
For those in the 25 to 35 percent brackets, the marginal DWL measures
are much larger. In a case where the tax cuts expire for only the top two
brackets and we assume an ETI of 0.5, the result is a marginal DWL of
$1.30 per dollar of revenue. However, at an ETI of 0.2, the marginal DWL
is over 75 percent smaller. The marginal DWL per additional dollar of
revenue is greatest for the 25 and 28 percent brackets. Raising rates on
this group results in behavioral responses that lower revenues, while the
"windfall" revenue from those in higher brackets (that is not associated
with any additional DWL) is small because there are so few filers in the top
two brackets.
Laffer Curves. It is widely accepted that behavioral responses to taxation (as

measured by the ETI) act to offset revenue gains from an increase in tax rates
and revenue losses from a decrease in rates. The degree to which this occurs,
however, is a hotly contested issue. If higher tax rates cause less income to be
reported, the result can be a net reduction in revenues. At one extreme, the
government will receive no tax revenue at a 0 percent tax rate. At a tax rate of
100 percent, the government may also receive no (or at least very little) revenue. Thus, the revenue-maximizing, or Laffer, rate must be somewhere
between 0 and 100. While the Laffer rate "optimizes" revenue collection
(given other institutions in the economy), it should not be confused with an
optimal tax rate, which economists use to describe the rate that raises a given
amount of revenue with the fewest distortions to the economy
The curve which shows the relationship between tax revenue and tax
rates has borne the eponym "Laffer" for thirty years. The idea is much older,
however. It was formally presented by French engineer and economist Jules
Dupuit in the 1840s; and as early as the fourteenth century, the polymath
Ibn Khaldun wrote: "At the beginning of the dynasty, taxation yields a large
revenue from small assessments. At the end of the dynasty, taxation yields
a small revenue from large assessments. "28
Table 5-7 reports Laffer rates for each of the 2005 tax brackets under
the various ETI assumptions. Laffer rates are very high at the bottom brack-

THE ELASTICITY OF TAXABLE INCOME 129
TABLE

5-7

LAFFER RATES UNDER A RANGE OF DIFFERENT

ETI

ASSUMPTIONS

2005

2005

MTR

EMTR

0.2

0.4

0.5

0.6

O.S

1.0

10%

0.302

0.972

0.946

0.934

0.922

0.899

0.878

15%

0.349

0.871

0.772

0.731

0.695

0.631

0.579

25%

0.400

0.692

0.530

0.475

0.430

0.362

0.312

28%

0.390

0.693

0.531

0.476

0.431

0.363

0.313

33%

0.413

0.754

0.605

0.551

0.506

0.434

0.380

35%

0.407

0.775

0.634

0.581

0.536

0.464

0.410

ETI =

Author:S calculations.
NOTES: Rates that would maximize combined revenue from federal income taxes, state taxes, and payroll taxes.

SOURCE:

ets because much of the revenue raised from these rates comes from filers
in higher brackets. Laffer rates for the upper-income brackets are much
lower and are quite sensitive to the ETI. At an ETI of 0.2, the revenuemaximizing rate from the top bracket is 77.5 percent-well above the current EMTR of 40.7 percent. At an ETI of 1, the picture is quite different,
with the Laffer rate just slightly above the current EMTR. Note that these
are the Laffer rates that would maximize combined tax revenue from the
federal income tax, state income taxes, and federal payroll taxes. The rates
that would maximize federal income tax revenue alone would be higher
than those reported in table 5-7. This is especially true under the higher
ETI assumptions, where offsetting revenues from an increase in federal rates
can be substantial
Figure 5-3 plots the full Laffer curves for the top tax bracket under each
of the ETI assumptions. The curves are generated under the assumption
that the ETI is constant across all tax rates (on a given curve). In reality, little can be known about the ETI at rates far from those seen in the data. In
any event, the curves illustrate the dramatic difference in the relationship
between tax rates and tax revenues across a range of ETIs present in the literature. For comparison, the diagonal line shows the relationship with no
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FIGURE

5-3

LAFFER CURVES FOR VARIOUS TAXABLE INCOME ELASTICITIES

$350

Average Effective MTR
:
(top bracket) = 0.407 ~ •

$300

(i)

c

$250

~

iii

:§.

$200

Q)

::J

cQ)
>
Q)

$150

a::

><

~

$100

$50

$0
0.00

0.15

0.30

0.45

0.60

0.75

0.90

Effective Marginal Tax Rate

SOURCE:

Author's calculations.

behavioral responses-implying that tax revenue increases linearly with tax
rates, and no Laffer point is ever reached.

Conclusion
This chapter reviews recent literature on the ETI, highlighting important
theoretical and empirical findings. In terms of theory, the ETI has been
shown to be one of the central parameters for measuring the efficiency costs
of the tax system and for measuring the revenue implications of tax
changes. That said, recent research highlights instances when the ETI accurately captures the efficiency implications from a tax change and when the
parameter may overstate or understate these consequences. Other research
has shown that the ETI is not a structural parameter, but rather a function
of institutional features that policymakers may have under their control. On
the empirical side, recent research suggests that the ETI is substantially
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smaller than early estimates of it by Feldstein (1995a) and Lindsey (1987)
and that the Ell increases with income. Recent research also finds Ell estimates to be quite sensitive to an array of factors, and the range of plausible
estimates is therefore broad.
Based on 2005 data, I estimate that returning individual income tax
rates to their 2001 levels would raise revenues by $98.6 billion dollars,
assuming no behavioral responses. At an Ell of 0.2, $12.2 billion (or 12
percent) of this mechanical increase in federal income tax revenue would
be lost due to reductions in taxable income. Another $3.4 billion in revenue
would be lost from payroll and state taxes. At an Ell of 0.8, $48.8 billion
(or 49 percent) of the mechanical revenue gain would be lost. Another
$13.6 billion in revenue would be lost from payroll and state taxes. Ihe
DWL per dollar of additional revenue from the federal income tax is also
highly sensitive to the Ell; it ranges from $0.18 at an Ell of 0.2 to $1.25
at an Ell of 0.8.
Laffer rates for each tax bracket and Laffer curves for the top tax bracket are sensitive to the range of Ell estimates found in the literature. An Ell
of 0.2 implies a Laffer tax rate for the top tax bracket of 78 percent. On the
other hand, at an Ell of 1, the estimated Laffer rate is just 41 percent, or
slightly higher than the current effective marginal tax rate for this group.

132 NOTES TO PAGES 101-106
Notes
1. Specifically, the ETI equals the percentage change in reported taxable income
associated with a 1 percent increase in the net-of-tax rate, where the net-of-tax rate
equals the share of the next dollar of reported taxable income that is not taxed, or 1
minus the marginal tax rate.
2. The survey did include questions on labor supply elasticities and narrower
questions regarding behavioral responses to taxation.
3. Most tax legislation, and especially the Bush tax cuts, encompass more than
simple changes to the rate structure. Some opposition, or support, for tax measures
may be due to those other factors, and not necessarily to the changes to marginal tax
rates.
4. While the estimate is toward the high end of the current literature, it was less
so at the time Feldstein was writing.
5. Specifically, it is the compensated elasticity (or the substitution component of
the overall elasticity) that is important for measuring efficiency Compensated elasticities measure the portion of the overall response attributable to changes in relative
prices (as opposed to the portion of the response due to changes in income). It is the
distortion in relative prices that leads to losses in efficiency
6. An NBER working paper version of the 1999 article was released several years
earlier, in 1995. This earlier version influenced researchers prior to the publication of
the 1999 version and contains different policy simulations than the later version.
7. There are exceptions when assessing efficiency and revenue implications from
a tax change that is complex. For example, suppose tax rates rise and, in response,
taxable income falls, but a portion of that drop in taxable income is due to increased
charitable contributions (and suppose those charities produce positive externalities).
Or, suppose that a tax increase is used to finance an underprovided public good.
In instances such as those, where external costs or benefits are present, assessing efficiency implications is more complex.
8. However, Harberger does separately examine the effects of taxing savings.
9. This is not a revenue projection for 2011, but rather applies projected 2011
rates to 2005 data. A projection for 2011 would account for expected income growth
through 2011, as well as other factors that would affect revenues.
10. When offsets to revenue from payroll and state taxes are taken into account, the
range is from $0.19 to $1.72.
11. However, Hall and Liebman (2000) suggest that the large transitory response
observed by Goolsbee (2000) could reflect the exercising of past stock options and
stock appreciation rather than a response to changing tax rates.
12. Following Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002), I use "avoidance" to mean avoiding the
tax, but not avoiding the activity For example, choosing leisure is one way to avoid
paying income tax, but that decision falls under real substitution and not avoidance,
because the consumption bundle has changed as a result of the tax.
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13. For income shares updated to 2006, see www.econ.berkeleyedu/~saezJ
TabFig2006prel.xls.
14. See CBO (2007).
15. For a review of the empirical literature, see Giertz (2004).
16. An income effect variable is also discussed, but is left out of their most-preferred
specification.
17. Note that this is a partial equilibrium approach, except to the extent that the ETI
is influenced by indirect responses to tax changes occurring throughout the economy
For a general eqUilibrium approach to evaluating changes to tax rates, see CBO (2004).
18. Tax rate changes at lower brackets can be analyzed analogously by focusing on
the group of taxpayers facing the marginal rates in the bracket whose rate is changing. However, with a tax rate increase there will also be a gain (and with a decrease
in the tax rate there will also be a loss) in revenues from those with incomes in the
higher brackets. In the section below, I assume that a change in tax rates for a lower
tax bracket results in no behavioral responses by those in higher tax brackets,
although it is possible that there could be a response to the income effect.
19. Again, for more detail on how these responses are calculated, see Saez (2004).
20. This subgroup is not broken out in IRS (2007). Thus, I assume that individual
MTRs return to their pre-EGTRRA levels, except that marriage penalty relief is
extended.
21. Note that EMTRs and MTRs can be very different from average tax rates, which
simply represent total taxes divided by total income. For an analysis of average
income tax rates across income groups and over time, see Pike tty and Saez (2007).
22. See IRS (2007), table 3.4.
23. Total tax revenue includes some revenue from capital gains taxes, so long as
capital gains were taxed at a lower rate than the filers' top rate on ordinary income.
24. Dollar values are expressed in 2005 terms unless otherwise noted. Compare
CBO (2008), which reports that extending the cuts in individual rates, along with the
child tax credit, would lower revenues by $96 billion for 2011 and $152 billion for
2012. Those estimates account for interactions with the AMT, which are ignored in
this paper. The CBO numbers also account for some behavioral responses but assume
that total GDP is not affected by the rate changes.
25. Total 2005 revenues for this paper are $894.7 billion, which is smaller than total
2005 individual income taxes because it excludes some capital gains revenues and
revenues from the Alternative Minimum Tax.
26. Note that if EGTRRA truly expired, the upper-income limit for the 15 percent
tax bracket for married filers would fall, raising tax rates over a small range from 15
to 28 percent. This change is ignored in the analysis.
27. Again, this assumes no income effects.
28. Quoted by Laffer (2004, 1-2). That the curve is named for Laffer is an example
of Stigler'S law of misonomy, which holds that no discovery is named after the person
who initially makes it.
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